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Abstract
A lack of consensus has existed regarding the interaction of English modals with categories such as tense, and individual modal forms can vary in the extent to which they make assertions regarding temporal reference. The present work attempts to provide a compositional semantic account of English modals by proposing that these forms may be inflected both for tense and for mood. The cross-linguistic status of inflectional moods such as the subjunctive is examined; it is argued that an inflectional subjunctive exists in Modern English with semantic properties similar to those of comparable forms in older Indo-European languages, and the extent to which linguistic cues would permit learners of English to acquire such a category is discussed. Data on English modals are reviewed in light of the analysis proposed here to determine its compatibility with observed usage. It is suggested that the analysis proposed here has certain advantages over models in which the observed semantic range of English modals is presented in terms of an unprincipled heterogeneity.
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1. Introduction
English modals have been the object of considerable study, with regard both to their syntax and to their semantics. However, little consensus has been achieved regarding the semantic and syntactic interaction of modals with categories such as tense, and certain phenomena remain for which it is difficult to account under existing models (e.g. Portner 2009: 221–230). In the present paper the hypothesis is proposed that English modals have not only tense but inflectional mood, like comparable forms in other European languages such as French and German; it will be suggested that this hypothesis accounts better for the observed data than available alternatives. The goal of the present paper is to examine the syntactic and semantic evidence for the proposed analysis and to elaborate it in a manner that provides a compositional analysis of modal constructions and shows the semantic contributions of the modals themselves and of their tense and mood features.
In order to clarify the proposals made below, some preliminary terminological discussions are necessary. Different categories of modal expressions are often distinguished; one distinction commonly drawn is that between epistemic modality, which makes reference to concepts such as possibility and probability, and ‘root’ modality, which does not. This distinction can be seen respectively in examples such as the following (after Palmer 1986: 19):
(1)	a.	John’s light is on; right now he must be in his office. 
b.	Yesterday John was able to have a day off; today he must be in his office.
From a semantic perspective it is possible to make many further distinctions among modal expressions; for example, the category of root modality may be divided into categories including deontic modality, as in (1b) above, relating to obligation, and dynamic modality, relating to the semantic force conveyed by modals such as can in their use to express properties such as ability, volition or disposition (see further Portner 2009: 140). However, not all semantic distinctions proposed are equally likely to be reflected in the syntax; as discussed below, a number of authors have suggested that root modals as a group differ syntactically from epistemic modals, whereas the existence of comparable syntactic differences, for example, between deontic and dynamic modals, has seldom been proposed (for review see Papafragou 2000: 86–92). Accordingly, the label ‘root’, despite the semantic heterogeneity of the constructions that it encompasses, will be employed in the present paper. In order to facilitate comparison of the proposed analysis to models in which the epistemic/root distinction is central, the examples below will illustrate the interaction of tense and mood both with epistemic and with deontic modal constructions. Another distinction that is sometimes made is that between ‘agent-oriented’ and ‘speaker-oriented’ modality (see e.g. Nuyts 2001: 193–200); for example, when can is used dynamically to denote an ability it refers to a property of an agent and is therefore agent-oriented, whereas when it is used deontically to grant permission the possibility it expresses arises from the speaker and it is therefore speaker-oriented. While such a distinction is valid from a semantic perspective, it does not necessarily correspond to lexical or syntactic distinctions, as will be illustrated in greater detail below, and is not necessary for the purposes of the present paper.






‘I have come so that they may see me.’
(4)	Beati	sitis.
blessed.nom.pl	be.2pl.prs.sbjv
‘May you be blessed.’
(5)	Quid	maneam?
what.acc.sg	remain.1sg.prs.sbjv
‘Why should I remain?’
(6)	Si	moneam,			audiat.
if	warn.1sg.prs.sbjv		hear.3sg.prs.sbjv
‘If I were to warn, he would hear.’
As can be seen, forms termed ‘subjunctive’ occur in a variety of constructions, including exhortations, wishes, expressions of purpose, and conditionals. 
The question arises of what relationship may be held to exist among the categories in different languages to which the term ‘subjunctive’ has been applied, given the varying distributional patterns noted above. When subjunctive-like forms in a sample of unrelated languages were compared, it was found that they tend to be used for similar illocutionary purposes and that their development tends to follow similar diachronic paths (Bybee et al. 1994: 212–236). Subjunctive forms in different languages would therefore seem to share certain semantic traits, although the goal of providing a robust and cross-linguistically applicable semantic definition of this category has in general proved elusive (for review see Nordström 2010: 25–47). Nevertheless, some semantic generalizations are possible, of which the most useful may be that subjunctive forms are marked explicitly as not asserting the truth of the proposition in which they occur (e.g. Palmer 2001: 3–4), in contrast to the unmarked indicative.  As can be seen from the examples above, there are a wide range of purposes to which a morphosyntactic category with this semantic property can be put. Such categories of mood are treated here in a manner similar to that adopted by Dahl (1985) for tense and aspect: cross-linguistically recurring categories such as subjunctives are characterized by a complex of features which are found in different languages but which need not each be present in every case. According to such an approach, the more restricted subjunctive of a language such as French may be seen as having a subset of the semantic features of the classical subjunctive. While it is not necessary that all languages should embody such semantic categories in their grammar, the fact that grammatical forms belonging to these semantic categories, despite the ‘fuzziness’ of their definitions, do recur cross-linguistically to such an extent may be taken as a sign that these semantic categories have some innate cognitive salience.
It may briefly be noted that older Indo-European languages such as Classical Greek made a distinction between ‘subjunctive’ and ‘optative’ modal forms, the optative representing in general a greater degree of unreality, and that the forms termed ‘subjunctive’ in Latin and the Germanic languages derive in varying ways from a conflation of the two categories (e.g. Fortson 2004). However, it is not necessarily the case that the optative and subjunctive represent two separate and semantically discrete categories of modality. The morphological resemblance of the Indo-European subjunctive and optative to present and past indicative forms respectively has long been noted (e.g. Goodwin 1889: 389), and it has been suggested that the greater degree of unreality expressed by the optative results from the addition to the subjunctive of past-tense morphology, which itself can convey modal semantic content (Palmer 2001: 204–207). Such ‘modal pasts’ will be discussed in greater detail below; at present it is sufficient to state that it is not necessary to interpret modal systems of this sort in terms of a tripartite distinction.
At this point it may also be in order to discuss the status of the subjunctive in English in general, without reference to modal constructions. Of the English constructions to which the term ‘subjunctive’ has been applied, perhaps the most distinctive and formally discrete class is that seen in examples such as the following:
(7)	I insist that he do this.
A considerable degree of controversy has existed regarding the analysis of such constructions in English. Many authors have gone so far as to deny that the subjunctive exists as a meaningful category in English (e.g. Palmer 2001; Huddleston 2002). However, alternative analyses have generally proved problematic; a review of such analyses is provided by Aarts (2012: 1–11). Aarts’ own analysis involves a construction-based approach in which forms such as (7) are seen as a discrete clause type, with little commitment to any specific morphosyntactic analysis of the verbs in such constructions. However, such an approach has the drawback of isolating constructions such as (7) from other forms termed ‘subjunctive’ both in other languages and within English, and of dismissing any syntactic and semantic similarities among such forms as deriving from the historical accident of common origin rather than considering the possibility of any synchronically operative unity. If such a unity exists, an analysis that takes it into account might be to some extent preferable in terms of its explanatory power.
The term ‘subjunctive’ has also been applied to other types of construction in English, notably to past-tense constructions such as the following:
(8)	I wish that I were there.
In considering such constructions, it should be noted that be is the only verb in English that has separate morphology available for such constructions; as a result, forms such as (8) are often seen as isolated fossils (e.g. Palmer 2001; Huddleston 2002). While the absence of distinct forms for other verbs could be seen as simply another instance of the greater morphological richness of be, the use of past tenses in such counterfactual tenses to indicate unreality even in the absence of any formal subjunctive category to which this semantic content could be ascribed is a widely attested cross-linguistic phenomenon (e.g. Iatridou 2000); therefore, the possibility must be considered that any modal semantic properties of such verbs are due to past-tense morphology alone. Moreover, it is probable that the productivity of morphologically distinct forms such as (8) differs among varieties of English. The existence of forms such as (8) is therefore not in itself sufficient to establish their status as productive subjunctives; further evidence may be necessary to establish the productivity of the past subjunctive as a category within Modern English.
A premise of the current work is that the subjunctive does exist in English as a distinct inflectional category whose semantic properties are similar to those of the classical subjunctives discussed above, although their syntactic distribution may differ. As stated above, the existence of constructions such as (7) and (8) is not in itself sufficient to establish conclusively the existence of such a category. However, when taken in conjunction with the data discussed below for which the existence of inflectional mood may be the best available explanation, these phenomena together may constitute a body of evidence more robust than the individual items would be on their own.
2. Modals and morphosyntactic categories
2.1 The syntax of modals
 A diverse array of syntactic analyses has been proposed for English modals, many of which are incompatible with the proposals made here. While an exhaustive review of the extensive literature on this subject would be beyond the scope of the present paper, a brief survey may be useful in illuminating the foundations of the present work.
As will be seen below, some syntactic analyses of modals consider them to be base-generated within their own functional heads, and are incompatible with the possibility that these forms could be inflected for tense and mood; there are certain phenomena that have been seen as supporting such analyses. It has long been recognized that different modals differ in their scope relations with negatives, as the following examples show.
(9)	John cannot go.
‘It is not possible for John to go.’ (not ’It is possible for John not to go.’)
(10)	(If she is still here,) Mary must not have gone.
‘It is necessary for Mary not to have gone.’ (not ‘It is not necessary for Mary to have gone.’)
Such differences have been adduced as evidence for a fundamental syntactic distinction between the modals in (9) and (10). For example, Cinque (1999) suggests that such phenomena are an example of cross-linguistically observable syntactic differences in epistemic and root modals, and provides evidence that in languages where multiple modals can co-occur, epistemic forms such as (10) take higher scope than root forms such as (9); accordingly, his proposal is that epistemic and root modals occupy their own separate and unique functional heads. However, a number of objections have been raised to such an analysis (for review see Papafragou 2000: 92–105). First, it has been observed that the scope relations illustrated above obtain regardless of whether the modals are used in an epistemic or a root sense; for example, in a sentence such as Mary must not be here, the modal must has scope over the negation regardless of whether the meaning is ‘Mary is forbidden to be here’ or ‘Mary’s being here is logically impossible’. While forms expressing epistemic modality may tend to take the higher scope when combined with forms expressing root modality, it has been observed that this has an independent semantic motivation; for example, a sentence such as It is possible for this to be permissible is more likely to correspond to a state of affairs in the real world than a sentence such as It is permissible for this to be possible. As these examples show, ordering of the sort described by Cinque can be seen even in multi-clausal structures and is therefore independent of the order of syntactic heads within a single clause. Moreover, if one can imagine a pragmatic context in which it is possible to give permission not only for the occurrence of something but for its possibility, such as a fairy-tale setting, even sentences such as the latter become felicitous.  It may therefore seem that there are enough difficulties with Cinque’s analysis that its incompatibility with the present proposal is not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle.
An alternate approach was taken by Cormack and Smith (2002), who propose that the fundamental syntactic distinction shown by examples such as (9) and (10) is not between root and epistemic modals but between necessity and possibility modals; according to their analysis each type of modal is generated within its own head, and these heads differ in their position relative to different types of negation. However, this approach has also been subject to certain objections (see Iatridou and Zeijlstra 2010). The existence of two separate syntactic heads for modals is taken by Cormack and Smith to exist at the level of Universal Grammar, and it might therefore be expected that similar patterns could be observed cross-linguistically; however, the English pattern has few close parallels in other languages. Cormack and Smith acknowledge the existence of considerable cross-linguistic variation in the scope relationships between different modals and negation, and propose that the assignment of modals to one head or the other is to some extent lexically specified. As a result, the proposed syntactic heads would not necessarily correspond exactly to semantic categories such as necessity and possibility, and it would be more difficult to argue that the proposed syntactic categories have any consistent semantic properties by which learners might identify them. The primary evidence that these two groups of modals occupy different syntactic heads would seem to be their different positions at the surface level. However, an approach that can explain such surface variation without the need to posit syntactic distinctions for which there is little other independent evidence might have some advantage in terms of parsimony.
The approach taken in the present paper builds on recent work seeking to explain scope differences of the sort seen in (9)–(10) in terms of lexical polarity and perhaps also neg-raising (Homer 2011; Iatridou and Zeijlstra 2013); such analyses attempt to provide explanations for these phenomena which do not require the existence of separate syntactic positions for different types of modals. As a result, it is possible to construct syntactic analyses in which all modals can be envisioned as arising lower than I0, so that they would therefore be theoretically capable of bearing inflection to the same extent as other verbal forms. The present work follows Iatridou and Zeijlstra (2013: 546–547) in holding that if it is possible to explain the observed phenomena along such lines, such a syntactic model is not only more parsimonious but accords better with the data. It may be observed that other English auxiliaries such as have and be are uncontroversially able to receive tense and mood marking to the same extent as lexical verbs, as can be seen in examples such as the following:
(11)	He was doing this all day yesterday.
(12)	I insist that he be doing this when I arrive.
In (11) the auxiliary be is marked as a past tense, while in (12) it appears in a subjunctive-type construction parallel to (7) above; an analysis that interprets (7) in terms of inflectional mood would presumably treat (12) in the same way. If the presence of such inflected auxiliaries can be accommodated within a given syntactic model, it should be possible to extend this to provide a parallel treatment of inflection on modals.
A brief word may also be in order regarding the differences among categories of modals with respect to the syntax-semantics interface. Some theories have viewed epistemic and root modals as different both syntactically and semantically, in that root modals assign an agent role to their subjects; by some authors (e.g. Jackendoff 1972: 219) this assertion has been made of the class of root modals as a whole, including both dynamic and deontic modals (for further review see Wurmbrand 1999). Other theories view modal constructions as representing multiple, incommensurable semantic classes that merely happen to be represented by the same polysemic lexemes (e.g. Palmer 1990). However, the assignment of modals to classes such as root or epistemic is often highly dependent on pragmatic and contextual factors, with some forms inherently indeterminate (for review see Papafragou 2000: 22–39), and therefore the assumption of such a fundamental distinction is difficult to maintain. This work follows the approach first set out by Kratzer (1977) to the extent of assuming that semantically unitary modals are interpreted as having epistemic or root senses on the basis of the pragmatic context. Under such an approach, root and epistemic modals both make assertions regarding propositions; however, the assertions made by root modals are more likely to have corollaries involving agents. In other words, if it is possible for John to swim, then this entails that John must have the ability to swim.
2.1. Modals and tense
It is hoped that the foregoing remarks will have shown that there is no cogent justification for discarding a priori the possibility of modals’ being inflected for tense and mood; however, further evidence is necessary to establish that this possibility is in fact realized. The issue of modals and tense will be addressed first. Modern English modals descend from verbs that were marked for tense in a syntactically unexceptional fashion (e.g. Warner 1993). However, as will be seen, a number of factors have operated to render the relationships more opaque between forms that historically were present and past. Examples of the apparent tense inflection of modals are easily found, as in the following sentences (after Palmer 1990: 107–109):
(13)	a.	John can swim. 
b.	Even when he was a young boy, John could swim.
(14)	a.	Lions can be dangerous. 
b.	Dinosaurs could be dangerous.
As these examples show, can and could can be used in asserting the existence of potentiality respectively in the present and the past, both in root and epistemic​[1]​ uses. It has frequently been observed that historical past-tense forms such as could continue to express temporal content comparable to regular past tenses (e.g. Palmer 1990) and that they enter into the expected paradigmatic relationships with the corresponding present forms in contexts such as reported speech (e.g. Portner 2009: 221–224). The view that such examples do not reflect a single lexeme being inflected for tense would therefore require the assumption that the forms in question have entered into an arbitrary suppletive relationship which happens to mirror the historical situation. On the other hand, forms such as could are also used in contexts where no reference is made to past time as such, as in the following example:
(15)	Mary doesn’t know what to do this afternoon. She could swim, play tennis, or go for a walk.
The difference between the semantic content of modals such as could in this example and that of canonical past-tense forms has led some authors to argue that such forms are no longer true past tenses but rather separate lexemes (e.g. Warner 1993: 148–150; Bybee 1995). In general, an implication of such analyses is that the semantic differences between the could in (13b) and the could in (15) are due to polysemy and are not susceptible to a compositional explanation. As suggested above, the analysis proposed here is that the semantic differences between (13b) and (15) can be explained compositionally in terms of the addition of modal properties to the latter. Specifically, these differences are analyzed in terms of inflectional mood, and therefore the term ‘indicative’ will be applied to modals of the former type, and ‘subjunctive’ to those of the latter.
2.3. Tense and mood
At this point it may be useful to explore in greater detail the semantic effects of combining the subjunctive with past-tense morphology.  These phenomena will be illustrated first by examples of past subjunctives from languages in which the status of this inflectional category is not in question; it will then be possible to return to the issue of potentially similar forms in English. As mentioned above, inflectional subjunctives are used in a wide variety of constructions, and their syntactic distribution may vary cross-linguistically; however, examples such as the following may be most relevant to the Modern English phenomena.
(16)	Si 	viveret, 	verba 	eius	audiretis.
if	live.3sg.impf.sbjv	word.acc.pl	his	hear.2pl.impf.sbjv
‘If he were living, you would hear his words.’ 
(after Allen et al. 1903: 328)
(17)	Gif	he	nære	soþ	God[…],	na	him	englas	ne	þegnodon.
if	he	neg.be.pst.sbjv	true	God	never	him	angels	not	serve.pst.sbjv​[2]​
‘If He were not the true God, the angels would never serve Him.’ 
(from Mitchell 1985: ii, 807)
Example (16) provides a Latin parallel to (6) above; example (17), from the Old English Blickling Homilies, shows a similar use of past subjunctives within a Germanic context. It may be seen that these past subjunctives are characterized by the expression of a greater degree of hypothetical or contingent meaning than their present-tense equivalents. The past subjunctive could also be used to express such conditional or hypothetical meaning even in main clauses and in the absence of explicit conditional markers such as if, as can be seen in the following example:
(18)	Him	wære[…]	ðearf	ðæt	hie	leten	Godes	ege	hie	geeaðmedan
them.dat	be.pst.sbjv	need	that	they	let.prs.sbjv	God’s	fear	them.acc	humble.inf
‘There would be need for them to let the fear of God humble them.’
(Mitchell 1985: ii, 858)
Constructions of this sort are not necessarily to be analyzed as elliptical conditionals (see Mitchell 1985: ii, 858). A non-elliptical analysis tallies with the perspective of Kratzer (1977), according to which it is necessary only for the intended basis of modality to be recoverable from the pragmatic context, without the need for listeners to conceive a specific syntactic structure by which this basis might be made explicit. As a result, if constructions such as (15) above are to be analyzed as past subjunctives, there is no need to view a sentence such as ‘Mary could swim’ as an ellipsis of something such as ‘Mary could swim if she chose to’.
As these examples show, in Old English conditional or hypothetical content could be expressed by the use of past subjunctive inflections in both the protasis and the apodosis of such conditionals. Diachronically, in the apodosis of these constructions, the bare past subjunctive came to be supplanted by the past subjunctive of willan ‘will’, a process which was already observable in Old English (see Mitchell 1985: ii, 807–808). This process continued throughout Middle English, at the same time as the presence of morphologically distinct subjunctive endings continued to decline (Mustanoja 1960: 452–453). However, this development towards periphrasis was not shared by modals. These periphrastic constructions consisted of a modal, in what was originally a past subjunctive form, followed by the infinitive of the main verb; not only were modals losing the infinitive forms needed for such constructions, but the subjunctive forms of modals such as will continued to be needed to form the periphrases involving lexical verbs. The question then arises of whether the modals in such periphrastic constructions continued to be interpreted as subjunctives or were subject to some form of reanalysis. In languages with formally distinct past subjunctives, such as Modern German, it can clearly be seen that the combination of such inflection with modals produces forms in which the compositional effect of tense and modality remains transparent, as in the following examples:
(19)	Gestern	konnte	Hans	schwimmen
yesterday	can.pst.ind	John	swim.inf
‘Yesterday John was able to swim.’
(20)	Morgen	könnte	Maria	schwimmen
Tomorrow	can.pst.sbjv	Mary	swim.inf
‘Tomorrow Mary could swim.’
(21)	However, in a number of languages the loss of the past subjunctive has led to the appropriation of past indicative morphology to express modal semantic content, even where no formal syncretism has taken place (e.g. Iatridou 2000: 263–266), while other languages, such as Classical Greek, possess formally distinct past subjunctives but nevertheless use past indicative forms in expressions of modal semantic content, as in the following example:
(22)	εἰ	τούτο	νῦν	ἐποίεις	ἡμάρτανες	ἄν
if	this	now	do.2sg.impf.ind	err.2sg.impf.ind	irr
‘If you were now doing this, you would be wrong.’
(after Palmer 2001: 208)
Nevertheless, in such languages, modal pasts are usually recognizable through their occurrence in specific syntactic contexts such as conditional constructions; in the case of the Greek example above, there is also an explicit irrealis particle, ἄν. As a result, learners of these languages are able to recognize that the meaning of the past-tense morphology in these contexts differs from that in those contexts where it asserts the existence of an event in past time. The case of the English modals is noticeably different. As shown by the foregoing examples, identical forms can express either past-tense or ‘modal’ meaning in the absence of any overt formal cues as to which is intended. Moreover, unlike the cases discussed above, this is not a general property of English past-tense forms. The analysis proposed here is therefore that English modals have in fact remained one of the last bastions of the subjunctive in main clauses, and that the indicative/subjunctive distinction has sufficient cognitive validity as a cross-linguistically recurring category to allow learners of English to interpret these forms as differing in mood even in the absence of any overt morphological cues.
3. Application to Data
If modals can have both tense and mood, then four combinations would be possible: present indicative, present subjunctive, past indicative, and past subjunctive. However, it will be seen that not all possible combinations occur for each modal. It is proposed here that some modals are lexically defective with regard to the tense/mood combinations that can be realized. The concept of defective paradigms is one that has elsewhere been discussed with reference to modals in another respect, their lack of non-finite forms, although the extent to which this can be seen as true defectiveness varies according to the syntactic analysis adopted (e.g. Baermann and Corbett 2010: 2). Defective paradigms have been associated especially with verbs displaying some previous degree of morphological irregularity (e.g. Maiden and O’Neill 2010), and a variety of other factors may contribute to the development of such paradigm gaps (see Boyé and Hofherr 2010). Although the precise circumstances favoring the emergence and maintenance of lexically defective paradigms cannot be predicted with certainty, such paradigm gaps nevertheless arise and persist in many instances. As will be seen below, one of the factors that may contribute to the existence of paradigm gaps for modals is formal syncretism and the ambiguity that results from this.
In order to illustrate which tense/mood combinations are possible for which modals, it may be useful to discuss different modals individually. However, one such combination, the present subjunctive, is best dealt with on its own. The only modal for which there exists clear data regarding the present subjunctive is may. This modal displays syntax unambiguously characteristic of the subjunctive in its use to express wishes, as in the following example:
(23)	May your new venture succeed.
Despite the high-register associations of such constructions, this syntactic pattern undoubtedly enjoys greater productivity with may than with any other modal. However, given the limited productivity of this syntactic pattern in general, the absence of parallel constructions with other modals is not in itself evidence for the existence of a defective paradigm. It is nevertheless difficult to find evidence for the use of other modal verbs in the same environments in which subjunctive constructions with lexical verbs can occur.
(24)	??I demand that he can do this.
(25)	I demand that he have this ability.
There is a clear distinction between these two examples; the oddity of (24) is due solely to its pragmatic infelicity, the expression of an apparently unfulfillable demand, while in (23) the grammaticality of the construction itself is questionable. In general, it may be said that there is little evidence for the use of modals other than may in constructions that might plausibly be interpreted as present subjunctives.
Before turning to a consideration of individual modals, a brief word is in order regarding diagnostic criteria that may be used to identify the remaining tense/mood combinations. It will be seen below that morphological marking is sometimes not in itself a sufficient guide, and as a result the use of semantic criteria may be found useful. As suggested above, a characteristic of the present indicative is that it can be used to assert that the truth of propositions with reference to the time of utterance, as past indicatives can be used to assert the truth of propositions with reference to a time prior to that of the utterance (in terminology similar to that of Reichenbach 1947); while the extent of both these categories is too broad to be fully encompassed by such simple definitions, for the present purposes the expression of such semantic content by a grammatical form may be taken as sufficient to assign it to one of these categories. It should also be noted that in English the present indicative can also be used for states and events persisting into or beginning in the future (e.g. John often swims; My flight leaves tomorrow.). In contrast to the present and past indicative, subjunctive forms are marked as non-assertive, as stated above. Accordingly, the past subjunctive is not used to assert the actual truth of a proposition with reference to a specific point in time, but rather to introduce the idea that its truth is contingent on some hypothetical state of affairs. As suggested above, semantic content of this sort may often be crudely paraphrased by means of a conditional expression. The following examples will illustrate the extent to which these criteria can be used to show the alignment of observable modal forms with the proposed analysis.
A clear illustration of these diagnostic criteria is provided by can, as a brief recapitulation of the foregoing examples will show.
(26)	John can swim.
(27)	Even when he was a young boy, John could swim.
(28)	Later this afternoon Mary could swim.
The first two of these examples straightforwardly assert the ability of John to swim at the present and in the past, respectively. In the model described above, they would be characterized as present and past indicatives. In contrast, example (27) does not make an assertion about Mary’s being able to swim, whether in terms of internal ability or external possibility, at a particular moment in time. Instead, Mary’s ability to swim is presented with reference to a hypothetical situation, with no commitment to the realization of this hypothesis, although this hypothetical situation may take into account currently known facts about the real world. It is proposed that unlike the past indicative in (26), (27) is a past subjunctive.
The use of may in present subjunctive constructions was discussed above; the remaining possibilities will be seen below. Examples of the present indicative are readily found, both for root and for epistemic senses:
(29)	John may go, but you must stay.
(30)	John may go, or he may decide not to.
The past indicative of may, however, shows signs of obsolescence. Its use for deontic purposes may seem somewhat old-fashioned (see Palmer 1990: 104), as in the following example:
(31)	They told John that he might go.
In epistemic constructions, the distinction between past indicative and past subjunctive tends to become neutralized:
(32)	I wondered whether this might happen.
In an example such as (31), the subordinate clause might be paraphrased either as ‘whether it was possible for this to happen’, with reference to a specific moment in past time, or ‘whether it would be possible for this to happen’, with reference to a hypothetical state of affairs. In either case there would be little difference to the meaning of the sentence. Accordingly, epistemic sentences such as this would not provide clear cues for learners of English regarding the productivity of the past indicative. This circumstance and the relative infrequency of deontic sentences such as (30) might contribute to the decline of the past indicative. In contrast, there are many examples of constructions with might that could not be interpreted as past indicatives, in which there is clearly no reference to past time (e.g. OED s.v. ‘may’); this is true of the following examples:
(33)	John is asking whether he might leave.
(34)	I wonder what might happen today.
Examples such as these would help to confirm for learners the productivity of the past subjunctive, and might lead to the interpretation of ambiguous constructions such as (29) as subjunctives. This process illustrates how modals may develop towards defectiveness of the sort described above.
In the case of shall, there is an observable difference between the distribution of the categories termed here present and past indicative and that of the past subjunctive. Due to the difficulty of finding accurate paraphrases for this form, relating the observed constructions compositionally to a single, semantically unified lexeme is less straightforward than for some other modals; however, cross-linguistic data will be adduced to show that such an analysis is not untenable. For shall, the most salient semantic distinction is that between overtly deontic uses and those in which it is an auxiliary of the future. The use of the present and past indicative in both these senses can be seen in examples such as the following:
(35)	a.	This shall never happen.
b.	They foretold that this should never happen.
(36)	a.	I shall leave at six o’clock.
b.	I said that I should leave at six o’clock.
The use of shall as a future auxiliary shows considerable dialectal variation and is recessive in many varieties of English (e.g. Leech 2003; Gotti 2003), although the processes involved may be more complex than the mere supplanting of shall by will (see Nesselhauf 2010). Accordingly, the frequency of forms such as (35) would vary among varieties of English. The same would apply to past subjunctives corresponding to the future use of shall, such as the following:
(37)	I should be surprised if it rained tomorrow.
However, past subjunctives with a deontic sense enjoy greater productivity, as in the following example:
(38)	Mary should have left at six o’clock if she wanted to catch her train.
As mentioned above, it is difficult to provide an English paraphrase for a construction such as (37) in order to illustrate the compositionality of its semantic content; however, a form from another language, such as French devoir, may provide a more useful basis for an illustrative paraphrase. In the present indicative this verb is semantically not dissimilar to shall, although having perhaps a stronger deontic force:
(39)	Je 	dois 	partir 	demain.
I	devoir.1sg	leave.inf	tomorrow
‘I am to leave tomorrow.’
In Old French, when the language had a fully productive past subjunctive, the combination of past subjunctive morphology with this lexeme was semantically comparable to English should, as the following example shows: 
(40)	Il	ne	deust	pas	avoir	foï	Marie	et 	Marthe.
He	neg	devoir.3sg.impf.sbj v	not	have.inf	flee.pst.ptcp	Mary	and	Martha
‘He should not have fled from Mary and Martha.’
(Löfstedt 2008: 131)
In Modern French, where the imperfect subjunctive is obsolescent and has a more restricted distribution, the same meaning would be expressed using a conditional form; although there are also some syntactic changes in the way in which modals and perfects are combined, the semantics are still transparently compositional. 
(41)	Il	n’aurait	pas	dû	fuir	Marie	et	Marthe.
He	neg=have.3sg.cond	not	devoir.pst.ptcp	flee-inf	Mary	and	Martha
It is obvious that the use of a past subjunctive in Old French to express semantic content of this sort does not mean that English should must also be a past subjunctive; however, if there is sufficient cross-linguistic similarity in the semantic content of past subjunctive morphology, then the meaning of English should could then be derived compositionally from the combination of such morphology with a lexeme semantically similar to French devoir. The question remains open, however, of whether should in these constructions is still associated with the present tense shall or whether there has been some lexical split; this may vary among varieties of English depending on the extent to which learners are exposed to the past indicative should mentioned above. Such reanalysis has undoubtedly taken place in the case of ought, which originated as the past subjunctive of owe by a semantic process similar to that which took place for should. However, learners’ identification of a form as subjunctive may not be solely dependent on its opposition to a corresponding indicative. One possibility is that if learners are able to identify the relevant instances of would and could as past subjunctives, their formal and semantic similarity to should might create some predisposition towards a similar analysis.  Some limited support for the notion that by whatever means, should in this sense is identified as a subjunctive form is provided by Iatridou and Zeijlstra (2013: 539–546).  They note the existence of scope differences between should and must in certain negative-polarity environments, as in the following examples:
(42)	At most five students must leave.
‘There must be no more than five students leaving’ or ‘There are no more than five students who must leave’
(43)	At most five students should leave.
‘There should be no more than five students leaving.’
(both from Iatridou and Zeijlstra 2013: 538)
In other languages studied, such as Dutch and Modern Greek, the scope restriction seen in (42) was paralleled only by forms that were explicitly marked as counterfactual.  However, further work would be necessary to determine the exact relationship between counterfactuality and this scope pattern, and to establish its strength as a diagnostic criterion.
Like ought, the form must derives from what was originally a past subjunctive; however, in this case what was once a highly defective paradigm, like that of ought, has been reanalyzed to provide indicative forms at the cost of a high degree of formal syncretism. The form must can be used as a present indicative, as in the following examples, repeated from above:
(44)	a.	John’s light is on; right now he must be in his office.
b.	John’s light was on; he must have been in his office.
(45)	Yesterday John was able to have a day off; today he must be in his office.
 Sentences such as (43) and (44) assert the necessity, epistemic or deontic, of John’s being in his office with reference to the moment of utterance. In (44) it is explicitly stated that John’s obligations with regard to being in his office have not remained constant; in (43), the assertion regarding the conclusions that are to be drawn from the evidence should perhaps be characterized as the use of the present in a ‘timeless’ sense (e.g. One plus one equals two), which would be compatible with the use of the same tense to refer to the logical relations between past events. In addition to its use with reference to present time, must can also be used as a past tense, either indicative or subjunctive, without overt morphological change; examples analogous to the following are cited in the OED (s.v. ‘must’):
(46)	Yesterday I decided that I must go to bed early that night.
(47)	If Mary had been there, things must have happened in the same way nevertheless.
(‘…things would have to have happened…’)
However, examples such as (45) and (46) may be less common in recent use than examples such as (43) and (44); it might not be an overstatement to suggest that the use of must as a present indicative is now predominant.
An analysis among similar lines can also be applied to will. As in the case of shall, the epistemic/root distinction is not so relevant as in the case of some other modals.​[3]​ Instead, a more salient distinction is that between expressions of volition and of futurity. The present and past indicative are both used quite productively in each of these senses:
(48)	a.	John says that he won’t be a party to this.
b.	John said that he wouldn’t be a party to this.
(49)	a.	Mary says that it will rain.
b.	Mary said that it would rain.
Similarly, past subjunctive forms are easily found:
(50)	If we had more rain, it would be better for the crops.
However, it should be noted that the past indicative of will is restricted in its distribution, in a way not seen in other modals such as can; it can be used more freely in indirect discourse than elsewhere, the following examples illustrate.
(51)	John said that he would go to Paris.
(52)	John would go to Paris.
‘John wanted to go/insisted on going to Paris.’
not ‘John was going to go to Paris.’
By some authors (e.g. Warner 1993: 148–150), the impossibility of using would in a future sense in environments such as (51) is seen as further evidence that would is not simply a past tense of will. However, this phenomenon is equally problematic for all analyses; even if it is assumed that would is a separate lexeme and that it is not a past tense, it remains to be determined why it can function suppletively as the past tense of a future auxiliary in (50) but not in (51). Furthermore, the factors involved do not appear to be purely syntactic. It is possible to use would as the past-tense equivalent of future will in main clauses if the context provides cues that allow its interpretation in this sense, as in the following example:
(53)	John had heard the weather forecast. It would rain all the next day.
One possible semantic explanation of this phenomenon is that the present form will does not merely assert that an event is currently planned, but also that it actually takes place at some point following the time of utterance:
(54)	John is going to go to Paris. Of course, something might prevent him.
(55)	John will go to Paris. ??Of course, something might prevent him.
In (54), the second sentence seems to contradict the first to a greater extent than in (53). This additional semantic content may perhaps be interpreted as a conventional implicature in the sense of Potts (2005). Other modal expressions may provide parallels for such a phenomenon, as can be seen from the following examples:
(56)	Mary doesn’t dare to shock people; sometimes she just does it by accident.
(57)	??Mary daren’t shock people; sometimes she just does it by accident.
In (55), the negation of non-modal dare can be understood in a metalinguistic sense which is not incompatible with the assertion that shocking still takes place; in contrast, the use of modal dare seems to require that it does not take place at all. If modals such as will and dare possess semantic complexity of this sort, the use of past indicative would would then assert that an event was not merely intended at a point in the past, but that it subsequently took place at a later point in time, with no commitment to the relationship of that point to the moment of utterance, and would therefore be less informative than other possibilities. Such an interpretation can explain why past indicative would is acceptable in sentences such as (52), where the context provides adequate temporal information, and sentences such as (50), where there is no commitment to the truth of the proposition ‘John goes to Paris’; however, in a sentence such as (51), without further context, a volitional reading of would becomes the most felicitous interpretation. While the foregoing material is not intended as an exhaustive examination of the semantics of will or dare, it at least provides some preliminary suggestion of how the observed distribution of would may be susceptible to a purely semantic explanation which is not incompatible with its being interpreted as a past tense.
4. Conclusion
The aim of the present paper has been to explore whether an analysis of English modal constructions with reference to tense and mood can account for the range of observed phenomena. The use of certain modal forms to convey temporal information is difficult to explain without reference to tense, while the use of the same forms with conditional or hypothetical meaning instead of direct temporal reference cannot be explained in terms of tense alone. It has been proposed here that this results from the interaction of tense with another inflectional category, mood. Although an analysis along these lines entails the assumption of a high degree of formal syncretism, it has the advantage of allowing modal expressions to be analyzed in a compositional manner that relates broad ranges of meaning to individual, semantically unified lexemes and obviating the need to assume a heterogeneous collection of unrelated forms showing widespread polysemy. Some of the examples discussed seem to indicate a trend towards more uniform form–meaning correspondences, such as the possible tendency of must to be used more with reference to the actual present. However, for other modals, such as could, there is less clear evidence for any such trend. Any semantic theory of modals must take into account the fact that individual forms can express more than one type of temporal or reality-related content; all other things being equal, an analysis that attempts to explain this variation in terms of principled compositionality may be preferable to one that does not.
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^1	  While it has sometimes been questioned whether can has any epistemic senses at all (e.g. Papafragou 2000:76–79), usages that are ‘existential’ in the sense of Palmer (1990) undoubtedly bear as close a semantic resemblance as possible to epistemic constructions.
^2	  For discussion of Old English subjunctive morphology relevant to this example, see Mitchell (1985: i, 252–256).
^3	  Some authors (e.g. Palmer 1990; Portner 2009) have made reference to the ‘epistemic’ use of will (e.g. There’s the doorbell; that will be John.); however, such usage might best be seen as a contextual use of the future (‘…that is going to turn out to be John’), and similar constructions are found in languages such as French in which the future is an inflectional category formally discrete from the verbs used to express concepts such as possibility and obligation.
